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I. Introduction
Since the end of the Korean War, the balance of power in Northeast Asia has been significantly shaped by an enduring Republic of Korea (ROK)-US alliance. Despite the constant threat of a resumption of hostilities between the two Koreas, the current structure maintains a status quo that assures the balance of power in Northeast Asia. However, if hostilities or a collapse of the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) lead to a unified Korea; its choice of alignment could disrupt the relative balance of power imposed on the region since 1953 and lead to a host of potential security crises for the United States.
A unified Korea has three broadly defined alignment options-tilt West towards the United States and Japan, tilt East towards the People's Republic of China (PRC), or pursue neutrality/nonalignment; each with their own advantages, disadvantages, and nuanced variations.
Scholars espouse a wide range of views on these options. Rear Adm Michael McDevitt, US Navy (Ret), a senior fellow with the Center for Naval Analysis Strategic Studies, identifies the options of alignment with the United States, alignment with the PRC, "strategic independence" and neutrality. 1 In "strategic independence," he sees a unified Korea as neutral, possessing with Japan. 5 Cha provides an alternative and nuanced view of alignment with the western powers, where despite the continued alliance, a strong and unified Korea is "less reliant on the U.S.," and possesses closer ties to Japan. 6 Scholar Chae-Jin Lee focuses on the pros and cons of alignment with the United States and nonalignment-providing a compelling argument for nonalignment. 7 On 24 September 2014, "citing the fall of the Berlin Wall 25 years ago, President Park Geun-hye of the Republic of Korea . . . used her address to the annual high-level meeting of the [United Nations] General Assembly . . . to call on the United Nations to spearhead efforts to tear down the world's last remaining 'wall of division' and reunite the Korean peninsula." 8 She proclaimed, "just as the unification of Germany laid the grounds for a new Europe by integrating
Europe, a unified Korea will set in motion a new Northeast Asia." 9 With unification the decision on strategic alignment will transform the regional and international order as we now know it.
The decision will likely be influenced by history, culture, and nationalism and informed by the ROK's security dilemma-its economic (inter)dependence on a rising and increasingly powerful PRC and its strategic alliance with the United States, 10 and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Assessing these variables, Korea will likely see its best option to advance its national interests and promote peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia as neutrality/nonalignment.
II. Geostrategic Significance of a Unified Korea
The assumptions that underpin the potential geostrategic significance of a unified Korea 
III. The Current Strategic Environment
The existing strategic environment will undoubtedly influence the alignment of a unified
Korea. Seoul will have to confront and reconcile the regional negative and positive effects of economic, security, and political polarity vis-à-vis Korea.
The ROK's number one trading partner is the PRC, followed by the United States and 25 The ROK, Japan and the PRC continue to work towards a trilateral free trade agreement despite recurring and intermittent tension emanating from Japan's insensitivities over wartime atrocities, territorial disputes and efforts by Japan to redefine its defense posture. 26 A free trade agreement between the PRC, Japan, and the ROK, could have significant implications-further integrating their economies (representing 20% of the world GDP and 17.5% of global trade) 27 and Northeast Asia has been immune to the dramatic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War; remaining in a status quo, it has yet to fully adjust to the post-cold War order. 28 The region is divided with the PRC increasingly reluctant to support the DPRK while the United
States, Japan and the ROK are largely cooperating to confront the common DPRK threat.
Despite "the conflicting geo-strategic interests . . . toward the Korean Peninsula . . . inhibit [ing] the institutionalization of regional structures," 29 the United States, the ROK, Japan, the PRC and Russia, share a common desire to prevent nuclear proliferation and for the denuclearization of the Peninsula. 30 US forward presence and its bilateral arrangements with Japan and the ROK, coupled with the PRC's support to the DPRK, enables regional stability and assures stable relations between Japan and the ROK, despite latent grievances and animosities. 31 Assuming, the PRC seeks regional hegemony, US continued forward presence and the region's preoccupation with the DPRK and nuclear proliferation arguably softens the effects of the PRC's rise and delays the inevitable great power competition between the United States and the PRC. 32 Unification, however, could further expose, accelerate, and intensify competition; as the United
States and the PRC vie for influence over Korea.
The ROK and the United States share common values and interests, and are bound together by a strong and enduring military alliance. Despite the latent polarizing, historical and cultural animosities between the ROK and Japan, those two countries, with the help of the United States, have tempered their differences in the face of a common threat. Political and economic relations between the ROK and the PRC are the best they ever been since the two countries normalized in 1992. 33 Peninsula as a crucial factor affecting their own security." 38 Unification under the shadow of a rising PRC will pose multiple security dilemmas for Northeast Asia. 39 Unification would remove the DPRK threat, to include its nuclear weapons, but could also exacerbate latent tensions and territorial disputes, and lead to increased competition over the Peninsula. "Given Korea's strategic location… Seoul's choice of alignment among the great powers competing could potentially tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of one side or another." 40 The ROK's desired outcome for Korean unification is the formation of a "democratic" and "internationalist" nation. 41 A unified Korea, geo-strategically located, where competing great power interests converge, will ultimately determine and define the balance of power in Northeast
Asia. 42 Confronted with these stark regional realities; Seoul will have no choice but to consider, reconcile and balance to its own benefit the national interests of stakeholder nations.
IV. The Regional Powers' View
On In the past, China pursued amicable relations with Korea by inducing it into a client state relationship until Japanese occupation in 1910. 48 Following World War II and the Korean War, the PRC's preeminent concern on the Peninsula has been stability, 49 reflected in its post-Korean policies aimed at maintaining stability at any cost through nonmilitary means. 50 This is congruent with the PRC's preference for unification to be realized through a "peaceful, reasonable, and rational" process and its opposition to "disturbances to the stability on the peninsula from any direction." 51 Even if a ROK-US security agreement could be reached without garrisoning US forces in Korea, it would not settle well with the PRC. 52 The PRC prefers maintaining status quo and delaying unification. 53 With the passage of time, the PRC believes economic interdependence will only increase between it and both Koreas and thus its influence over the eventual process of unification. 54 In the end, if they cannot preclude unification, the PRC desires a process of unification that leads to a deferential Korea without a US military presence.
Japan desires a unified and democratic Korea that is nonnuclear, politically and economically transparent, allied with the west, and permits some semblance of continued US presence. 55 Alignment outside this construct will likely invoke concern and the perception that that a united Korea represents at best a political and economic rival, susceptible to PRC influence or worse, a strategic threat. 56,57 A unified Korea's alignment is of vital interest to Japan as it will fundamentally influence "Japan's relations with the other major powers whose interests intersect on the Korean Peninsula." 58 
V. Points of Polarity & Things to Consider
When deciding on how best to align, Korea will invariable have to consider, reconcile and balance history, culture and nationalism against its existing problematic economic/security dilemma 63 between the PRC and the United States.
Korea, because of its geostrategic location, "suffered a long and extremely violent history of humiliating foreign invasions and occupations" by China, the Mongols, and Japan. 64 A victim of the "Cold War," a divided Korea highlights its vulnerability to great power competition. The residual effects of Korea's volatile past persist today in the form of unresolved grievances and territorial disputes between Japan and Korea. 65 Although these grievances and animosities may serve as a convenient means of promoting cohesion (nationalism) "among the formerly split Korean people," Japan will likely find this unsettling. 66 If left unaddressed and unresolved, relations between the two countries are liable to worsen once Korea is unified.
67
History has left an indelible mark on the Korean culture and character, specifically as it pertains to the concept of hahn and Confucianism. Subjected to centuries of adversity at the hands of external powers, Korea developed a unique value called hahn-"a deep-seated feeling of shame, frustration, rancor and insecurity on the national psyche, resulting in a national sense of inferiority." 68 In the aftermath Korean War, the ROK Government actually capitalized on the concept to mobilize the people to overcome adversity, redeem "national honor, save face for the republic, and give Koreans direction to seek power, economic success and security." 69 Given this, one can expect hahn to play a decisive role to achieve ultimate redemption following unification.
Additionally Korea, like the PRC, is heavily influenced by Confucianism, especially with respect to the concepts of face and harmony. "In both Chinese and Korean cultures, causing another to lose face is both humiliating and can be seen as an ultimate discourtesy." 70 The concepts of face and harmony are inextricably linked and likely influence Korea's approach to conflict resolution. 71 Harmony is an important element of Korean culture; adverse to conflict, Koreans tend to eschew or ameliorate direct conflict. 72 Given this, we can expect a unified Korea to value international institutions and conduct itself in a multilateral approach in order to pursue regional harmony.
The emergence of Korean nationalism may be a natural byproduct of unification, especially as a mechanism to galvanize the people around a common identity. Even today, despite the division, and perhaps due to their common history, "both Koreas are immensely nationalistic and sensitive to outside interference." 73 Post-unification nationalism could push Korea away from one country towards another as in the case of Japan and the PRC. 74 Postunification Korean nationalism coupled with historical animosities and economic rivalry could lead to cantankerous relations with Japan, while economic interdependence, cultural and historical affinities move Korea closer to the PRC. 75 Conversely, despite the emphasis on Korean animosity vis-à-vis Japan, nationalism could lead to estranged relations with the PRC as relations with Japan simultaneously improve in the wake of a diminished US presence in Asia. 76 Nationalism, possessing properties of polarity, has the distinct potential to heavily influence the strategic alignment of a unified Korea.
Since the end of the Korean War, the US forward presence in the ROK contributed to regional stability, not only with respect to the DPRK, but also by repressing latent hostilities between the PRC and Japan, the PRC vis-à-vis the ROK and Japan, and lastly between the ROK and Japan. 77 Unification, however, coupled with a rising PRC, could expose and aggravate regional animosities and Korea's security dilemma. 78 To manage this, Korea must first reconcile its existing economic/security dilemma 79 between the PRC and the United States. Korea will likely be under immense pressure to choose between maintaining its strategic alliance with the United States at the risk of spoiling its relationship with the PRC or turning away from the United States, in order to maintain harmonic and economic relations with the PRC. The latter would almost certainly result in the reduction, if not the withdrawal, of US forces from Korea.
Second, Korea must contend with mounting Japanese and PRC competition for regional influence, historically kept in check by the US military presence in the ROK 80 and definitely prone to worsen in its absence. And finally, Korea must be cognizant of the risk that "unification will increase the potential for mutual suspicion between Japan and Korea." 81 Korea's alignment, in the face of great power competition, has the profound potential to destabilize the region-especially "if there is no dominant force to keep stability." 82 Korea is confronted with a classic "Catch 22" dilemma. If it elects to continue its alliance with the United
States it risks souring its relationship with the PRC and increasing tension. If Korea acquiesces to pressure and tilts towards the PRC, it runs the risk of inciting tension between itself, Japan and the United States. Once more, the profound and strategic decision of alignment will not come easy and it will not be black or white.
VI. Unified Korea's Alignment Choices
As noted, Korea has three basic alignment options broadly defined as tilt West, tilt East, or pursue neutrality/nonalignment, each with distinct advantages, disadvantages, and nuanced variations. The imperative is for Korea to determine which choice best advances its national interests, promotes regional peace and prosperity, and accounts for and reconciles the influence history, culture and nationalism.
Korea's initial tendency will be to continue the enduring ROK-US military alliance that presently enables regional peace and stability. Korea tilting towards the West, under the blanket of US security, would contribute to promoting harmony between Japan and Korea, preventing while also hedging their bets by drawing themselves more closely to the United States." 83 It is, however, unlikely that the PRC will accept a continuation of the existing ROK-US military alliance post-unification for any extended period. 84 The PRC has "been quite clear in unofficial dialogue that while they can understand a [ROK-US] alliance today;" given unification, "they would oppose as a matter principle a continuation of the alliance and of a U.S. military presence in Korea." 85 A continuation of the existing security alliance would certainly antagonize the PRC and place Korea in an undesirable and untenable position-caught in middle of great power competition between the United States and the PRC and Japan and the PRC. 86 
VI. Conclusion
The emergence of a unified Korea, a regional power in its own right, geo-strategically located, where great power competing interests converge, will ultimately define the balance of power in Northeast Asia. 108 Hence, how a unified Korea aligns itself will have profound implications for the region. Given the range of strategic alignment options and its tumultuous history, culture and existing security dilemma, Korea may prefer neutrality/nonalignment as the best option to advance its national interests and promote peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
Tilting towards the East, despite promoting harmonious relations with the PRC, could polarize and destabilize the region. Similarly, tilting towards the West, despite promoting harmony between Japan and Korea and preventing latent historical grievances and animosities from becoming drivers of instability, is liable to polarize and destabilize the region.
Nevertheless, neutrality/nonalignment, although the most likely option, is not a forgone conclusion; how Korea unifies, what nations support it during unification, and the state of geostrategic environment could alter Korea's calculus and result in a different outcome.
Given the strategic implications of a unified Korea's alignment, the United States should consider expanding its efforts to shape and influence the strategic environment towards a favorable outcome, encouraging Korea towards the West or at least to a position of favorable neutrality. The denuclearization of the Peninsula is more likely to result from unification; therefore the US support for Korean unification should go well beyond passive and rhetorical support. 109 "Such a policy shift would achieve many U.S. goals and would strengthen our inevitability." 114 Despite not knowing the date and method of unification, we do know, as President Park states, it is inevitable. Just as German unification transformed the European regional and international order, so too will unification of Korea. Absent substantially changed conditions, Korea is likely to favor neutrality/nonalignment. Given the strategic implications of its alignment, the United States must act now to set the conditions for an outcome congruent with US national interests.
